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Bodies and Pleasures in the Happy Limbo  
of  a Non-identity:  
Foucault against Butler on Herculine Barbin
Tetz Hakoda
Abstract: This paper aims to establish a theoretical dialogue between Judith Butler and Michel 
Foucault on the notions of  body and pleasure through an analysis of  their texts on the autobiography 
of  Herculine Barbin.  Butler claims that Foucault’s introductory essay to Herculine Barbin is somewhat 
inconsistent with his theoretical standpoint on sex and sexuality.  While appreciating his construc-
tionist approach, she doubts that Foucault ever succeeds in getting rid of  a utopian vision of  sexual-
ity.  However, her discussion seems to face another theoretical deadlock because of  her insistence on 
law and desire.  With much stress on the impossibility of  love of  Alexina, her own reading ends up 
with some fatalism under the law of  prohibition.  On the other hand, Foucault reads the memoirs as a 
record of  encounter of  an otherwise anonymous person with the emerging modern apparatus of  power. 
Re-reading his essay in this line, we can find a way of  thinking that is neither an idealistic identity-free 
body nor a fatalistic subject of  desire.
Keywords: Michel Foucault, Judith Butler, Herculine Barbin, sexuality, gender
Tetz hakoda is Research Fellow at the Institute for Research in Humanities, Kyoto University. E-mail: 
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* This paper is a revised English version of  the article published in Japanese under the same title in 
The Journal of  Ars Vivendi (The Seizongaku) 7 (2014): 214–28. This work was supported by JSPS 
KAKENHI Grant Number 25770031. I thank two anonymous reviews for their valuable comments, 
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1. Herculine Barbin in Contexts: Her Life and Relation to Foucault’s Theory 
of Sexuality
1. 1 The Life of  Herculine Barbin: Encounter with the Modern Medical Gaze
“Do we truly need a true sex?”  With this famous question, Michel Foucault started 
an essay that first appeared in 1980 as an introduction to the English edition of  Herculine 
Barbin dite Alexina B.1  In the same year, he published its French modified version as “Le vrai 
sexe (The True Sex)” in the journal Arcadie, now included in Dits et écrits.2  There, Foucault 
stresses that this “true sex” question only makes sense in societies where a certain social 
norm demands each of  us to have only one sex: male or female.3  Moreover, it was only in the 
late nineteenth century that this social requirement started to dominate Western societies. 
Those examined and determined to be “hermaphrodites”4 suffered enormous pressures under 
this new social order.
Liberalization and urbanization during the time of  industrial revolution gave greater 
freedom to those socially considered blurring the sexual boundary.  Hermaphrodites were 
seen as a menace toward the seemingly well-established male-female distinction as the word 
itself  sounded—as if  they had two sexes in one body.  Homosexuals or feminist activists 
were also sometimes called “hermaphrodites” as they were seen to make troubles in the divid-
ing line of  sexes.  On the other hand, that situation created an opportunity for medicine to 
intervene.  Alice Dreger affirms that the clinical/medical gaze showed more interest on those 
“biologically” diagnosed as “hermaphrodites” while medicine took great efforts to allocate 
“one true” sex to them.5  Foucault kept that context in mind in editing Herculine Barbin dite 
Alexina B.
The book, published in France in 1978 by Editions Gallimard6, includes several texts 
and some biographical information.  The main part is My Memoirs (Mes souvenirs) writ-
ten by Adélaïde-Herculine Barbin (1838–1868), who grew up as a girl with DSD conditions7. 
 1 “Introduction,” in Herculine Barbin: Being the Recently Discovered Memoirs of  a Nineteenth-
century French Hermaphrodite, ed. Michel Foucault, trans. Richard McDougall (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1980), vii–xvii.
 2 Michel Foucault, Le vrai sex, in Dits et écrits, vol. 3, Paris: Gallimard, 1994, 237–53.
 3 Recent scientific studies have shown that human sexual differences do exist and that they have a 
strong influence on sexual identification of  each individual. These argumentations are fully con-
sistent with criticism against the social norm that forces us to behave according to the socially allo-
cated sex under the current male-dominant, heterosexist social order. See Anne Fausto-Sterling, 
Sex/Gender: Biology in A Social World (New York: Routledge, 2012). Vernon Rosario sums up 
that view: “sex/gender/sexuality as a biological, psychological, and cultural phenomenon that is 
rich, diverse, and indefinitely complex, resistant to all simplistic reductionism, whether biological 
or discursive.” (Vernon D. Rosario, “Quantum Sex: Intersex and the Molecular Deconstruction of  
Sex,” GLQ: A Journal of  Lesbian and Gay Studies 15, no. 2 (2009): 280).
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The other texts included are two medical treatises, and several or administrative documents 
on her legal status (birth certificate, teacher’s registration, etc.).  In 1874, Mes Souvenirs 
appeared in public for the first time as a part of  the book by Dr. Auguste Ambroise Tardieu, 
a Parisian medico-legal expert.  According to Dreger, this autobiography is the only text with 
some volume written by a “hermaphrodite” in that period.8  This fact made her “case” popular 
among doctors then.  Foucault evaluated the text as being “not unique, but it is rare enough,” 
written by “one of  those individuals whom medicine and the law in the nineteenth century 
 4 A series of  terms “hermaphroditism,” “hermaphrodites” are now obsolete and avoided, as intersex 
movements that started in North America in the 1990s have successfully questioned the validity 
of  medical interventions on people with atypical genitalia (especially young children) in order to 
defend their human rights. Disorders of  sexual development or DSD is now the most frequently 
used expression. Its consensus definition in the medical field is “congenital conditions in which 
development of  chromosomal, gonadal, or anatomic sex is atypical” (Peter A. Lee, Christopher 
P. Houk, S. Faisal Ahmed, and Leuan A. Hughes., and in collaboration with the participants in 
the International Consensus Conference on Intersex organized by the Lawson Wilkins Pediatric 
Endocrine Society and the European Society for Paediatric Endocrinology, “Consensus state-
ment on the management of  intersex disorders,” Pediatrics 118, no. 2 (2006): e488). While the 
word “intersex” is still used, its meaning has been a focus of  debate. See Alice D. Dreger and 
April M. Hernedon, “Progress and Politics in the Intersex Rights Movement: Feminist Theory in 
Action,” GLQ: A Journal of  Lesbian and Gay Studies 15, no. 2 (2009): 199–224. While Éric Fassin 
briefly reviews the relationship between intersex movements and gender studies in his postface 
to 2014 French re-edition of  Herculine Barbin, he fails to mention these developments. See Éric 
Fassin, “Postface: Le vrai genre,” in Herculine Barbin dite Alexina B., ed. Michel Foucault (Paris: 
Gallimard, 2014), 237–43. In this paper, “hermaphroditism” and “hermaphrodites” only belong to 
the historical context in the late nineteenth century in France.
 5 Alice D. Dreger, Hermaphrodites and the Medical Invention of  Sex (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1998), chapter 1.
 6 Herculine Barbin dite Alexina B., ed. Michel Foucault (Paris: Gallimard, 1978).
 7 Armand Marie Leroi suggests that Herculine Barbin was with 5α-Reductase-2 Deficiency. His 
opinion is based on Alexina’s accounts (especially signs of  androgenizing in puberty and no men-
suration), Dr. Goujon’s text, and the attached images to it. See Armand Marie Leroi, Mutants: 
On Genetic Variety and the Human Body (New York: Penguin, 2003), chapter 7. A baby with this 
disorder has X-Y chromosomes but lacks an enzyme that transforms testosterone to dihydrotes-
tosterone. Thus, it is born with male-type internal and female-type external sex organs. When the 
doctors and people around the baby are not aware of  it, as it often happens, the baby is raised as 
a girl. According to a case report study, among those grown up as girls (like Alexina) in reaching 
their puberty and making a choice of  their social sex, some choose male and others female, and 
the former option is more likely. However, there existed no research for evaluation on the deter-
mining factors of  their choices. See Peggy T. Cohen-Kettenis, “Gender Change in 46, XY Persons 
with 5α-Reductase-2 Deficiency and 17β-Hydroxysteroid Dehydrogenase-3 Deficiency.” Archives 
of  Sexual Behavior 34, no. 4 (2005): 399–410.
 8 Dreger, Hermaphrodites, 23–30.
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relentlessly questioned about their genuine sexual identity”.
Adélaïde-Herculine Barbin was born to a poor family in Saint-Jean-d’Angély of  Northeast 
France on November 8, 1838.9  Alexina, as called by people around her, spent some years in 
a facility for impoverished children before receiving a charity scholarship at an Ursuline 
convent boarding school in Chavagne, where she stayed until 1853.  After working for a local 
bourgeois family as a residential housemaid, she joined the normal school of  Le Château 
d’Oléron.  In 1856, one year after getting the teaching license, Alexina found a job of  assistant 
teacher at a boarding school run by a wealthy family and started to live with them.
She or Camille, as she called herself  in her autobiography, soon made passionate friend-
ship with “Sara”, the youngest sister in the family as well as her colleague.  In the middle of  
the nineteenth century in France, two women at puberty or before marriage sometimes built 
up a closer bond, and their behaviors were not strongly condemned unless regarded as sin-
ful.  However, the relationship of  Alexina and Sara was so obvious that some of  their young 
students got abashed with it.
While their bond got stronger, Alexina suffered a chronic pain in the abdomen with an 
unknown cause.  Sara, very anxious about her health, suggested her seeking a medical advice, 
which Alexina categorically refused at first, but was finally persuaded into.  Later, the local 
physician who came to examine her body told that hers was different from other women’s. 
Some uncomfortableness about her own body and some religious sense of  guilt took her to 
the cathedral church at La Rochelle, where she made a confession.  It was spring 1860.  The 
bishop there showed compassion and advised her to seek some medical advice with an estab-
lished doctor, Dr. Chesnet, whose thorough examination found testis in her.  With this sign 
of  being male at that time (it was gonads that decided the sex of  an individual), Alexina was 
medically determined to be male.
In June of  the same year, she came back to her hometown and changed her legal sex 
to male with the new first name “Abel.” The circulated rumor got the owner family furi-
ous.  They fired Alexina and separated her from Sara.  Losing all hopes, Alexina/Abel left 
alone for Paris at the age of  twenty-one.  There she seemed to live a solitary life without any 
contact to her former lover.  In February 1868, at the age of  twenty-nine, she found dead 
of  carbon monoxide poisoning in an apartment in the Sixth Arrondissement, leaving the 
memoirs on the desk.  Her slightest hope of  getting married to Sara with her new legally 
male status, which Alexina expressed in her writing, never realized.  Soon after late Alexina 
became famous in Paris.  “Alexina’s fame was,” Dreger points out, “[…] attributable only 
in part to unusual anatomy.  It was rather more due to his availability as a specimen and a 
 9 In his interview with Éric Fassin, Daniel Defert recalled visiting with Foucault the places men-
tioned in Alexina’s memoirs to make sure her itinerary. See Fassin, “Postface,” 222–5.
 10 Dreger, Hermaphrodites, 51
zinbvn45.indb   94 2015/03/23   9:42:53
BODIES AND PLEASURES IN THE HAPPY LIMBO OF A NON-IDENTITY
95
spectacle.10”  In her case, the fact that she committed suicide in the center of  Paris leaving 
scandalous memoirs was a crucial factor for getting attention from physicians and the public.
1. 2 Herculine Barbin in Foucault’s Theoretical Context
In 1978, Editions Gallimard published Herculine Barbin dite Alexina B. as the first vol-
ume of  the new series La vie parallèle.  Though it suddenly ended with only two titles (the 
other one is Le Cercle amoureux d’Henry Legrand published in 1979), it is famous for the 
introductory essay Foucault wrote in 1979, “Lives of  Infamous Men,” where he referred to the 
lives of  the ordinary people whose freedom or even lives taken away by the modern admin-
istrative apparatus.  While it brought “dishonor” to them, the apparatus turned them into 
“particles” which gleamed for an only brief  moment under the “light” of  power.11  The power 
intervened trivial matters of  “nobody” people with various knowledge such as medical, legal, 
biological, or psychiatric one.  However, this knowledge always left some sort of  document 
while erasing the captured people’s real lives.  We could access their daily lives only through 
archived materials formulated in this way, where their brief  encounter with modern power 
documented otherwise unknown lives.
This is how the life of  Herculine Barbin has remained until today.  With her writing 
accounts included in his book, Auguste Tardieu wanted to discuss “Medico-legal issues” as 
the title of  his treatise indicated.  On the other hand, what mattered for Goujon was to be 
the first forensic researcher of  her body.  Local papers that reported the change in her legal 
status seemed to pay little attention to the feelings of  her and people around her.  However, 
the work of  putting these texts in one volume helped to see the particular power-knowledge 
settings during those years.  Foucault was once said to perplex Éditions Gallimard about the 
publication of  Pierre Rivière by claiming that such a fascinating text, even by an unknown 
author, did not require an introduction.  Thus, the same thing perhaps went with Herculine 
Barbin, as it had not included his essay until its new edition of  2014.
For Foucault, the study of  the history of  hermaphroditism belongs to the extensive 
research project of  “history of  sexuality,” an overview of  which he gave in the first vol-
ume of  The History of  Sexuality.12  As we know, however, Foucault soon abandoned this 
 11 See Michel Foucault, “Lives of  Infamous Men,” in Power, Essential Works of  Michel Foucault 
1954–1984, Vol. 3, ed. James D. Faubion, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: New Press, 2000), 157–75. 
Since his early years, Foucault had shown keen interest in the system of  Lettres de cachet during 
the Ancien Régime period. The system allowed people to appeal directly to the King for incarcera-
tion of  somebody who they considered to be in “infamy.” His research of  the archived materials 
disposed in Archives de Bastille greatly helped him to develop his theory of  power that power 
comes “below” because Lettres de cachet functioned as if  people actually “seduced” the adminis-
trative power to intervene their ordinary lives. See his own summary for this system, “Truth and 
Juridical Forms,” in Power, 65–7.
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initial project of  a six-volume study, to which the book of  1976 was supposed to serve as a 
general introduction.  Herculine Barbin originally belonged to that project and was related 
to the research on hermaphroditism in his 1974–75 Collège de France lectures Abnormals. 
Foucault here argued that hermaphrodites became a privileged figure of  “new monstrosity” 
from the end of  the eighteenth to the early nineteenth century; he situated the phenomenon 
in a broader context of  the representations of  and social control against sexual monsters and 
“abnormals.”13
2. Life and Sex in Law: Butler’s Criticism against Foucault
While Alexina’s My Memoirs has a strong connection to the modern Western social 
norm around the abnormals discussed in The History of  Sexuality Volume 1, Judith Butler 
suspects that Foucault’s introduction to the former has some inconsistency with the central 
thesis of  the latter.  According to her, this contradiction mainly comes from two assertions: 1) 
that bodies and pleasures are opposed to sex and desire and 2) that the former is the locus of  
resistance.  Specifically she points out a famous phrase in his 1976 book: “the rallying point 
for the counterattack against the deployment of  sexuality ought not to be sex-desire, but bod-
ies and pleasures.”14  According to Butler, Foucault understands the sexuality as “an open and 
complex historical system of  discourse and power.”15  This suggests that both sexualities and 
sexual identities are constructed in relation to “law” that governs institutions.  Thus, Butler 
says, we cannot presuppose a situation where “there is no identity.”  However, does such a 
deadlock in Foucault’s remarks on Alexina really exist?  Before discussing this, we have to 
identify the context of  her claims.
 12 Michel Foucault, The History of  Sexuality Volume 1: An Introduction, trans Robert Hurley (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1978).
 13 Michel Foucault, Abnormal: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1974–1975, trans. Graham Burchell 
(New York: Picador, 2003), 65–74. We might view this move as a transition from “monstrosity of  
nature” of  the seventeenth century to “monstrosity of  modes of  behaviors” of  the eighteenth 
century. While hermaphrodites had been seen as “monsters” for their “anti-natural” characteristic 
of  having sexual organs of  two sexes in one body, in the eighteenth century, they were identified 
with “malformed” body parts or genitals. The discussion of  their “monstrosity” was around their 
“anti-natural” behaviors caused by their bodily sex. This behaviorist-moralist view has a certain 
relationship with specific pathological conditions allocated to homosexuality in the late nineteenth 
century: “a kind of  interior androgyny, a hermaphroditism of  the soul” (Foucault, The History of  
Sexuality Volume 1, 43). Such expressions let us see how “one true sex” scheme shares an underly-
ing morality with this new conception of  “sexual abnormals.”
 14 Foucault, The History of  Sexuality Volume 1, 157.
 15 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of  Identity (New York: Routledge, 
1990), 121.
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2. 1 Debate on “Idea of Emancipation”
In Gender Trouble, Butler discusses Foucault’s “Introduction” in two separated parts. 
In chapter one, she compares Foucault’s view on the relationship between gender, sex, and 
desire with a psychoanalytical conception of  law.  In the second section of  chapter three, 
“Foucault, Alexina, Politics of  sexual discontinuities,” she extensively discusses Foucault’s 
“Introduction.”  In the former, Butler appreciates Foucault’s contribution to gender studies 
as he inverts a common conception of  sex as the cause of  sexuality.  Based on the reversed 
cause-effect, she claims that gender is “a unity of  experience, of  sex, gender, and desire,” 
adding that it is constructed in such a binary way under the presupposition of  heterosexual 
settings in order to strengthen its categorization.
The institution of  a compulsory and naturalized heterosexuality requires and regulates gender as 
a binary relation in which the masculine term is differentiated from a feminine term, and this differ-
entiation is accomplished through the practices of  heterosexual desire.  The act of  differentiating 
the two oppositional moments of  the binary results in a consolidation of  each term, the respective 
internal coherence of  sex, gender, and desire.16
Butler also argues that Foucault’s introduction to Herculine Barbin is a critique of  
“ontology of  substance” with “ontology of  accidental attributes.”  While the former sees 
the relationship between gender, sex and desire as substantial, relating sex to identity in a 
substantializing way, the latter reveals identity as a culturally controlled order, hierarchical 
principals, or a kind of  fiction.
Foucault advocates this ontology of  accidental attributes because, according to Butler, 
Alexina cannot be classified under the binary system of  gender thus causes a trouble.17 
However, Butler understands gender not as names or attributes but as something being con-
structed.  Gender or sexual identity is not a matter of  one-time naming or designation, but of  
its repetitive construction to get it “appropriate”.  Besides the relationship of  gender, sex, and 
desire presumes and fortifies compulsory heterosexual orders through repetitive practices.
Arguing from this viewpoint, Butler’s assessment of  Foucault’s essay goes on to suggest 
that here we find “the cause of  emancipation,” which he is said to have firmly rejected in The 
History of  Sexuality Volume 1.  Below is the essence of  her claim repeated a couple of  times 
in chapter three:
Although he argues in The History of  Sexuality that sexuality is coextensive with power, he fails 
to recognize the concrete relations of  power that both construct and condemn Herculine’s sexu-
 16 Butler, Gender Trouble, 30–31.
 17 Butler, Gender Trouble, 31.
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ality.  Indeed, he appears to romanticize h/er world of  pleasures as the “happy limbo of  a non-
identity”, a world that exceeds the categories of  sex and of  identity.18
“The cause of  emancipation” stands for a theoretical position that sees a world of  plea-
sures beyond law in a broader sense, or beyond a world where one is required to stick to the 
allocated identity.  For Butler, Foucault in The History of  Sexuality Volume 1 certainly sees 
sexuality as an apparatus of  power and excludes any conception of  sexuality as something 
before or after law.19  Yet, it does not mean that he does not deny the power of  law itself. 
Even though we reject the conception of  law that sets sex as the cause of  sexuality, its power 
remains our main concern because sex is a category produced by the apparatus of  power and 
that being allocated to one sex is both being subjected to social regulations and having a law 
that sustains them.20  In other words, we cannot conceive sex, gender, and sexuality without 
law of  prohibition because it is the law of  sexual difference that establishes homosexual 
desires as well as their subjects by banning or punishing them at the same time.  This theo-
retical framework puts same-sex or homosexual desires and subjects over same-sex bodily 
pleasures.  That is why Butler is critical to Foucault’s claim for Alexina’s non-identity.
2. 2 Prohibitions and Pleasures
Butler advances her critical reading on Foucault along this question of  law by coupling 
two words: emancipation and pleasures.
The sexual world in which Herculine resides, according to Foucault, is one in which bodily plea-
sures do not immediately signify “sex” as their primary cause and ultimate meaning (...).  On the 
one hand, Foucault wants to argue that there is no “sex” in itself  which is not produced by complex 
interactions of  discourse and power, and yet there does seem to be a “multiplicity of  pleasures” in 
itself which is not the effect of  any specific discourse/power exchange.21
The pleasures felt in a world without identity go beyond a sex under social regulations 
and law.  They always elude any capture by apparatus of  power.  Butler suspects that if  
Foucault’s way of  reading Alexina’s autobiography supports this kind of  assumption, it will 
 18 Butler, Gender Trouble, 120.
 19 This legal conception of  sexuality denotes at least two different things. A sexuality-before-law 
approach is a version of  Freudian-Marxist psychoanalytic social theory with the supposed bisex-
ual nature of  infantile sexuality. As for a sexuality-after-law approach, we can think of  anti-natu-
ral subversive practices of  sexuality.
 20 Butler, Gender Trouble, 122.
 21 Butler, Gender Trouble, 123.
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be inconsistent with the basic line in The History of  Sexuality Volume 1.  Hence, Butler sees 
things differently: law of  prohibition that governs female mono-sexual environments was 
the eventual cause of  Alexina’s death, admitting that women’s world of  the female boarding 
school was the paradoxical guarantee of  multiple pleasures.  She suggests starting with law 
and power around sex, not with bodies and pleasures.22
In her reading Alexina’s autobiography in reference to psychoanalytical prohibition, 
Butler focuses on the possibility and impossibility of  female intimate relationships.  On the 
one hand, Alexina, whose thought always swinged between melancholy and narcissism, 
deplored her misfortune while boasting how she had been so attractive to other women, 
claiming to her superiority to any man in that point.  On the other hand, her love was toler-
ated only within the religious female bonds like a pseudo-extended family.  Thus, its existence 
depends on the fragile balance between the religious, institutional imperative of  sisterhood 
and love, and the order of  prohibition: “Never cross the line.”
H/er sexuality is not outside the law, but is the ambivalent production of  the law, one in which the 
very notion of  prohibition spans the psychoanalytic and institutional terrains.  H/er confessions, 
as well as h/er desires, are subjection and defiance at once.  In other words, the love prohibited by 
death or abandonment, or both, is a love that takes prohibition to be its condition and its aim.23
The law that brings about gender compels each one of  us to be a man or a woman under 
the asymmetric relation where masculinity prevails.  Thus, Butler argues, Alexina’s sexuality 
is the logical production by such law: she will never be a “natural, free” subject in relation to 
such law as long as the subject “is not outside the law, but is the ambivalent production of  
the law.”24
If  we are to stick to Foucauldian sexuality theory, can we read Alexina’s memoirs only as 
a kind of  testimony that she was always subjugated to the law of  sexuality?  Butler admits 
the possibility of  asking a question: “How free is that play?”25  Because it does not seem to 
get along with her perspective of  “law,” we could doubt if  there could be some theoretical 
difficulty in her criticism against bodies and pleasures, which founds her strong argumenta-
tion for law.  In 1999, Butler revisits the point in an article and this will help us to see her 
discussion differently.
 22 Butler, Gender Trouble, 127.
 23 Butler, Gender Trouble, 134.
 24 Butler, Gender Trouble, 134.
 25 Butler, Gender Trouble, 129.
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2. 3 A Subject of  Desire that Precedes Bodies and Pleasures
In the final part of  The History of  Sexuality Volume 1, Foucault remarks that bodies and 
pleasures are the likely places of  resistance against power.  For Butler, this raises a hope for 
the possibility of  such bodies and pleasures as these:
pleasures that were diffuse, possibly nameless, intense and intensifying, pleasures that took the 
entire body as the surface and depth of  its operation.26
This kind of  wishful thinking, according to Butler, has had a strong impact well beyond 
mere theoretical implication.  Foucault’s remark has a practical effect on activism: separation 
of  bodies and pleasures from sexual differences means that sexual differences and desire are 
secondary to sex.  That vision makes it difficult to organize not only feminism but also other 
movements of  various sexual minorities including homosexuals.  Too much relativist view 
of  sexuality would undermine the basis of  sexual minority activism.27
For Butler, this bodies-pleasures pair reflects a view of  the body “idealized as a principle 
of  necessary and permanent disruption.”28  According to her, when Foucault claims that a 
body with a sex is always the rallying point of  counter-attack due to the workings of  dis-
course and power, he imagines that this body has a capacity to escape from them.  In addition, 
the resistance or emancipation enabled by that body relates to the element of  time whether 
they are to appear or they already appeared.  It is when, Butler says, the sex-desire precedes 
bodies-pleasures:
Thus, the very ‘sex-desire’ that bodies and pleasures are said to refute is precisely what bodies 
and pleasures must presuppose.  And ‘sex-desire’ must be presupposed in order for ‘bodies and 
pleasures’ to become the name for an historical time of  sexuality that is decisively beyond sexual-
ity in its regulatory sense.29
Foucault sees bodies and pleasures as the rallying point, and not as any historically 
determined point.  Butler does admit it.  However, as long as the discussion concerns about 
“the question of  whether there can be an emancipatory vision after the critique of  eman-
cipation,”30 time matters in bodies and pleasures.  She explains this point with reference to 
“subject of  desire,” expression found in the introduction of  The Use of  Pleasure.  Foucault 
 26 Judith Butler, “Revisiting Bodies and Pleasures,” Theory, Culture & Society 16, no. 2 (1999): 11.
 27 Butler, “Revisiting,” 11–2.
 28 Butler, “Revisiting,” 14.
 29 Butler, “Revisiting,” 17.
 30 Butler, “Revisiting,” 18.
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indeed says that the objective of  his modified project of  history of  sexuality was to study 
the process of  our self-recognition as “subject of  desire,” not “subject of  sexuality.”  However, 
“pleasures” discussed in the second volume of  History of  the Sexuality does not have much 
in common with the psychoanalytic or Hegelian term of  “desire.”  It functions as a research 
hypothesis to see how two grand themes of  self  and pleasures interacted with each other 
from ancient Greece to late Antiquity.
In spite of  this, at the end of  the article, we find some discussion about the relationship 
between subject, desire, and pleasures, which tells us the reason why Butler maintains a 
theoretical position against bodies-pleasures.
We also lose the chance to understand how pleasures are staged through the workings of  a desire 
that is the desire of  a subject, and how a subject is both constituted by power and a nodal point in 
the rearticulation and transformation of  power (…).  Its [= desire’s] opacity, however, is the mark 
of  the constraints by which our pleasures are produced, afflicted, enhanced and proliferated.  And 
pleasure might then be understood once again in relation to pain, and both in relation to desire and 
the problem of  recognition (…).31
For Butler, pleasures bring about a relationship of  an individual with the others through 
a series of  notions like pain, desire, and recognition enacted in a stage called “subject of  
desire.”  The bodies-pleasures couple is some “idyllic” place or regressive coupling supposed 
to have existed before the apparatus of  power captures them.
3. The Limbo of Non-identity
In Butler’s opposition of  bodies-pleasures to law-desire, the latter pair belongs to the pres-
ent, making us subjects while the former looks towards the past or the future as the moments 
of  emancipation.  Such utopian discourse will never realize as it imagines an impossible 
world of  a non-identity free from law of  sexuality.  Interestingly, her reading of  Alexina’s 
memoirs also seems to face another impossibility because, according to Butler, Alexina’s love 
developed around law of  prohibition and the law always intervened and finally ended her 
life.  If  this is the case, will her writings be understand as a tragedy?  In order to answer this 
question, we will go back to Foucault’s text by focusing our attention on what Butler denies: 
bodies-pleasures and a world of  a non-identity.
 31 Butler, “Revisiting,” 20.
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3. 1 The Only One “True Sex”
Foucault depicts obsession of  modern Western societies on “true sex” as follows:
They have obstinately brought into play this question of  a “true sex” in an order of  things where 
one might have imagined that all that counted was the reality of  the body and the intensity of  its 
pleasures.32
This sentence summarizes the whole question discussed in his text.  First, the pair of  
bodies and pleasures comes to our attention.  We can point out the word “sex” in this context 
designates both social sex (or gender, though Foucault had never used the word) and biologi-
cal sex or genitals.  One’s social sex is biologically and socially determined.  We are then sup-
posed to live with this sex allocated upon birth to the end of  life.  On the other hand, sexual 
desire is connected with “natural” or heterosexual orientation and behaviors, which are deter-
mined by external genitals.  At the same time, the intensity of  pleasures during sexual inter-
courses is the object of  moral scrutiny, in one way or another, in relation to the “holy” cause 
of  sexual reproduction.  Social sex, which plays an essential role in one’s life, has to be identi-
cal with the one that the forms of  external genitals (and gonads) tell.  This reflects a typical 
conception of  genital-oriented determination of  sex—the reproductive-heterosexist norms 
about sex have a great influence on human behaviors.  In fact, it was under these norms that 
they examined and determined Alexina as male, and forced her to change her legal sex.
However, Foucault points out that this idea was a modern invention.  In pre-modern 
periods, though the punishment of  hermaphrodites sometimes occurred for their bodily char-
acters, they were seen as those with genitals of  both sexes and could choose their social sex 
after they reached adulthood.33  It was in the eighteenth century that things started to change. 
As the modern state reinforced its ruling power, medicine, biology, juridical institutions, and 
administrative mechanisms functioned together to deny the freedom to choose one’s own 
social sex.
Henceforth, everybody was to have one and only one sex.  Everybody was to have his or her pri-
mary, profound, determined and determining sexual identity.34
What medicines found in the body of  a hermaphrodite was neither genitals of  both 
 32 Foucault, “Introduction,” vii.
 33 About social settings around hermaphrodites in early modern France, see Lorraine Daston and 
Katharine Park, “The Hermaphrodite and the Orders of  Nature: Sexual Ambiguity in Early 
Modern France,” GLQ: A Journal of  Lesbian and Gay Studies 1, no. 4 (1995): 419–38.
 34 Foucault, “Introduction,” viii.
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sexes, nor a predominant genital of  either sex.  They tried to locate a “true” genital hiding 
behind the confusing appearance.  The obsolete term, “pseudo-hermaphroditism,” suggested 
that sex was—or more or less still is—the question of  true or false.  While Foucault right-
fully recognizes that people have since challenged and modified such reductionist views, he 
suspects that this idea of  “only one true sex” has been deeply rooted in modern societies.  For 
example, some still see homosexuality as an “error” inconsistent with the “natural reality” 
that bodies tell us, and thus as a narcissistic “fiction”; the true sex conception seems to be 
still working there.  In other words, when the idea is widely accepted that each and every one 
of  us has to have one’s one true sex and “sexual” identity according to one’s determined sex, 
it acquires a new, imperative role that teaches each individual its own inner “truth”: sexual 
identity defines what an individual really is.  We live in a world that says, “At the bottom 
of  sex, there is truth.”35  Here, Foucault obviously aims his criticisms at psychoanalysis, or 
“hermeneutics of  a desiring man.”  However, at the same time what he keeps in mind is some-
thing beyond any particular field of  knowledge—general situations where sex and identity 
are treated in terms of  true or false under the “true sex” paradigm.
3. 2 Enigma of “the Happy Limbo of a Non-Identity”
Foucault locates Alexina’s accounts in the context where biology and medicine inter-
vened private lives of  ordinary people by demanding their sexual identification being consis-
tent with genitals.  He then points out that there is some obscurity about the personality of  
real Alexina.  Her writing style, old-fashioned and sometimes pompous, is, Foucault says, less 
original than typical to girls at that time.  On the other hand, Alexina’s obscurity seemed to be 
guaranteed by young women around her in any period of  her life.  Either as a student or as 
a teacher, she had lived among women.  Even if  they appeared to notice something different 
about her body, they never dared to find out her “truth.”  Foucault talked about this with the 
expression “truth game.”
It seems that nobody in Alexina’s feminine milieu consented to play that difficult game of  truth 
which the doctors later imposed on his indeterminate anatomy, until a discovery that everybody 
delayed for as long as possible was finally precipitated by two men, a priest and a doctor.36
There is an episode of  one stormy night in the dormitory in her autobiography37. 
Student Alexina, surprised by the strong sound of  thunder, happened to get naked as her 
robe stripped off  and her body attracted attention from other girls (at least she wrote so), but 
 35 Foucault, “Introduction,” xi.
 36 Foucault, “Introduction,” xii.
 37 “My memoirs,” in Herculine Barbin, 30–33
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there was no indication that they cared about her sex.  After leaving girls’ school, no woman 
wanted to find out her “true sex.” In these feminine environments—the school owner family 
she stayed with was a female household as well—, Foucault suggests, there were no chances 
for truth game that would try to find out anybody’s sexual identities or “true sex.”  Nobody 
would like to join the game, or rather nobody were aware of  its existence in such a world 
where they took it for granted that they were all women and were never demanded to choose 
to be either a man or a woman.  True sex of  others seemed to be out of  their concerns.
For Alexina, alone in a Parisian apartment by looking back to the past, this atmosphere 
was felt something like “the happy limbo of  a non-identity.”38  Foucault writes:
Falsely naive girls, old teachers who thought they were shrewd—they were all alike as blind as 
characters in a Greek fable when, uncomprehendingly, they saw this puny Achilles hidden in their 
boarding school.  One has the impression (...) that everything took place in a world of  feelings—
enthusiasm, pleasure, sorrow, warmth, sweetness, bitterness—where the identity of  the partners 
and above all the enigmatic character around whom everything centered, had no importance.39
As Butler never accepts the situation where there “exists no identity,” we have to find out 
what Foucault has to say in making such claims.  In his works, the word “identity” has lim-
ited appearances.  Besides, he mostly uses the word in the philosophical context as opposed 
to difference, and in other cases, it falls into the general use such as social status.  This par-
ticular essay is rare in that the word frequently appears with its sociological or psychological 
connotations.  Such use of  the word corresponds with the only one occasion in The History 
of  Sexuality Volume 1, where he discussed the truth of  oneself  being determined in relation 
to sex.40  We can also point out Foucault’s general reluctance to discuss the same-sex relation-
ship around the question of  “Who am I?”  He prefers to view the question of  homosexuality 
as that of  friendship between men or women, which disturbs the heterosexual social norm 
by forming different lines of  force.  For him, homosexuality is a matter of  constant invention 
of  affective and passionate relationships; same-sex sexual acts themselves do not always 
constitute homosexuality.41
 38 Foucault, “Introduction,” xii.
 39 Foucault, “Introduction,” xii–xiii.
 40 See Foucault, The History of  Sexuality Volume 1, 155–6. While the word “identity” appears several 
times in other parts of  the book, the rest of  the usages denotes “social status” or “the fact of  being 
exactly the same.”
 41 See his “Friendship as a Way of  Life,” in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, Essential Works of  Michel 
Foucault 1954–1984, Vol. 1, ed. Paul Rabinow, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: New Press, 1997), 
135–40. Like this interview, he talked about homosexuality as a way of  life in several occasions 
from the end of  the 1970s.
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In this context, the expression “(sexual) identity,” is about the situation where someone 
in the modern Western world is supposed to be male or female, that is, to have only one true 
sex in the mixed environment.  For example, just before “the happy limbo of  a non-identity” 
appears, the word “identity” refers to social sex tied to one’s true sex.
Alexina wrote her memoirs about that life once her new identity had been discovered and estab-
lished.  Her “true” and “definitive” identity (...).  It is not a man who is speaking, trying to recall his 
sensations and his life as they were at the time when he was not yet “himself.”42
This “new identity” is the legal status that the administration attributed to her upon 
the result of  medical examination: male sex, and the name “Abel.”  However, as Foucault 
remarks, we do not find any convincing evidence that Alexina, now officially called Abel, 
did her writings by identifying herself  with this new social register: she did not leave any 
palpable comments like “I wrote this as a man.”  Foucault seems to try to approach the iden-
tity of  the author as something that is neither male nor female (and not a “third sex,” which 
is undoubtedly inappropriate for our discussion as Alexina spent at least most of  her life as 
being a woman and she felt herself  being as such).  Furthermore, he wondered if  “she was 
still without a definite sex” even at the time of  writing her memoirs.43  Though we cannot 
confirm his speculation, the situations in Paris in her narrative leave us some hints.  Alexina, 
somewhat naïve in her nature and with health problems, had faced enormous difficulties in 
making a living in the largest city as a complete stranger; neither her education nor her past 
career helped to find a job.  It could be true that she suffered from living as a man after chang-
ing her legal sex.  She was completely alone in a world where there are two sexes, either of  
which is allocated to everyone and then a sexed individual is supposed to behave as such. 
This world never tolerates the attitude of  those who are not sure to which sex they belong.
We can compare these settings with the boarding school for girls where Alexina was able 
to live without any forced “choice” to be one sex because there supposed to be only women. 
In this sense, we understand “no identity” in “the happy limbo” not as a situation where one 
does not have any identity at all, but where one’s identity can be ambiguous or vague.  Indeed, 
the fact that Alexina lived in female environments “without” any sexual identity is unthink-
able.  Foucault writes: 
the intense monosexuality of  religious and school life fosters the tender pleasures that sexual 
non-identity discovers and provokes when it goes astray in the midst of  all those bodies that are 
similar to one another.44
 42 Foucault, “Introduction,” xiii.
 43 Foucault, “Introduction,” xiii.
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These lines suggest that the very possibility of  her pleasures were always tied to some 
ambiguity of  her identity only resided in the girls’ boarding school, or monosexual settings 
where she could live without being questioned about her “true” sex.
4. The World of Discretion, World of a Non-identity
We might ask if  these environments are somewhat merely “pre-modern” ones and that 
Foucault sees bodies and pleasures in such a nostalgic way.  To answer this is also to ask 
about how he understands the question of  “emancipation” in relation to bodies and pleasures. 
Further study of  the term “true sex” will help.
“The happy limbo” was a place that accepted some helplessness and passions Alexina 
had felt.  The word “discretion (discrétion)” that Foucault only included in the French edition 
of  the text gives a clue to explain the proper role that this happy limbo played.  He argues that 
the religious usage of  the word conveys the double meaning.
The discretion distinguishes as far as it should.  It has to be “indiscreet” as it has to search the most 
secret part of  the conscience.  However, by the same word, the directors of  conscience designate 
the capacity of  keeping the moderation: to know how far not to go, to remain silent on what one 
should not to talk about, to let the benefit of  the shadow lie over what would become dangerous if  
it is to be under the daylight.45
The word “discretion” seems to be at stake in this truth game.  Girls’ boarding schools as 
religious institutions are places of  being discreet where the particular rule dominates.  While 
they require the girls to examine their conscience and not to miss any tiny thing, they warn 
the same girls not to be too curious about the things around them.  The maintenance of  the 
balance between “saying anything” and “not saying about something” seems to be crucial 
there.
The boarding school for girls where Alexina stayed is not a place of  active “resistance” 
where people can bring trouble to the established gender order through their bodies.  Rather 
it protected her from the gaze of  men about whom she was always watchful as if  they looked 
for a chance to intervene and destroy her life.  It might well be because of  their voyeurism, 
but maybe she also felt them as someone out of  the boundary of  discretion.  Indeed, Foucault 
gives some reasons for her cautiousness by designating “two men, a priest and a doctor” as 
her possible enemies.46
 44 Foucault, “Introduction,” xiv.
 45 Foucault, “Le vrai sexe,” 120. (My translation.)
 46 Foucault, “Introduction,” xii.
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In France, since the early nineteenth century, modern medicine including psychiatry has 
intervened legal or administrative decisions especially in the field of  abnormality.  It inter-
vened the world of  religious discretion as it targeted body and mind as its proper objects in 
order to find the truth of  them.  In this biopolitical situation, Christianity, the origin of  reli-
gious discretion, could not keep their spiritual authority without relying on scientific truth. 
The episode between Alexina and the bishop she confessed with was an example of  this. 
Firstly he suggested her getting examined by his friend doctor, and at the second time they 
met after her examination, his advice to her was change her legal status and live as a man as 
determined by the medical checkup.  The religion that accepted “true sex” discourses failed 
to secure her the possibility of  choosing her own sex as she wished.
While Butler claims that the law of  prohibition made Alexina’s love “impossible,” 
Foucault does not take it as the necessary consequence.  Her atypical body, under the true sex 
regime, had to have a stronger relationship with the modern apparatus of  sexuality.  This 
fact might have some connection with her passions, pains, and other feelings she had when 
looking back her life as a woman.  However, she used her body, as other people did, in her own 
way to get pleasures in a world of  discretion against any danger or desire that might reveal 
all the secrets around bodies.  It is also not necessary to see her life as “resistance” based on 
“accidental attributes” as Butler says, nor to understand her life story as a critique of  “meta-
physics of  substance.”  The story could be read differently, as one not necessarily related to 
the question of  resistance.
If  what Butler calls Alexina’s “multiple pleasures” still existed in that boarding school 
world of  discretion, this was essential for Alexina’s way of  life to keep definitive distance 
away from medicalization of  the body.  While the discourse of  sexual difference surrounded 
her body even in a monosexual world, her “bodies and pleasures” did not belong to a utopian 
place but an actually existed place in her real life.  They were documented just because the life 
of  Alexina, which should have been anonymous, made a momentary gleam in contact with 
power, which intervened and finally ended her life.  It was indeed an accident, but Foucault 
does not read these stories of  life in terms of  resistance or emancipation.  He wants to make 
it visible how the apparatus of  power works and what her life was like in such conditions. 
 47 The interview cited in note 41, Foucault mentions Surpassing the Love of  Men written by Lilian 
Faderman in 1980 and goes on to say that the author, who tried to unearth homosexual relation-
ships at first, perceived that “it was uninteresting whether relationships could be called ‘homo-
sexual’ or not.” Foucault seems to claim that talking about loves and affections between women 
are more important than trying to identify these relationships with those of  homosexuality. See 
Foucault, “Friendship as a Way of  Life,” in Ethics, 138–9. He seems to avoid substantializing homo-
sexuality based on sexual identity or sexual acts, insisting historical contingency of  the situations 
around sexuality. This might raise a question about the possibility of  homosexuality itself  though 
it would surely go beyond the focus of  this paper, thus needs our further considerations.
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For him, “non-identity” is the status by a paradoxical discretion that never asked who one 
was or never dared to do so.47
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